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Russia's imperative and the energy factor

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ABSTRACT

The North Atlantic Alliance must absolutely fulfill its role in ensuring energy security, because it has an enormous strategic potential the ability to protect the infrastructure and the transit area in cooperation with partners in the event of a crisis situation. For this reason, the Alliance should fulfill their mission primarily with military means. Recent events show that in the European Union, the US and other countries have a great turn in the development of energy connections with Russia and a deep one Atlantic towards use new types of energy resources. NATO member states have all the possibilities to successively control this process, strengthening transatlantic bond despite the belligerent attitude of Russia. The results of this will contribute to promote an open and transparent global management and trade system energy.

Keywords: energy security, European Union, NATO

1. INTRODUCTION

The development of the recent EU energy policy is in the context of: increased dependence on energy imports (from 50% of total EU energy consumption in 2007 to 65% in 2030) the increase in prices (fivefold increase in oil prices between 2002 and 2010); (EU enlargement and historical relations with Russia / USSR and, relatively stronger reliance on energy imports; gas supply interruptions. As a result, energy security as defined by the EU

has been undermined and an open political window that the European Commission has tried to exploit.

The scope of this article concerns the assessment of European integration in the areas of external diversification of gas supplies and the European internal gas market, focusing on the first part of the definition of energy security in Europe. The EU. European Commission, 2012) [1]. The analysis is a theoretically informed exploration of the role of a supranational political entrepreneur, the Commission, and a contribution to the debate on the integration of the European Union and the relationship in terms of authority and political responsibilities between the State member and supranational level, applied to an area of high politics. The research question addressed is how the constellation of power in energy security policy has developed between the Member States and the Commission.

2. THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET

In modern conditions, infrastructure security energy can not be achieved without international coordination, because the energy sector and its infrastructure are becoming more and more global systems. An incident event in a country may bring consequences of disastrous consequences to others. Because protecting energy infrastructure requires international coordination especially on cross-border sections. The efforts of the Alliance go in this direction North Atlantic (NATO) to ensure safety energy and the protection of energy infrastructures. NATO presented threats to energy security on the list of the biggest threats to general security. In this way, energy security has remained placed at the center of the contemporary strategic debate. He came to that in the face of permanent instability in the Middle East, the protests the use of energy for its geopolitical goals by Russia, fragmentation of the EU's internal energy market with growing egoism economies of European countries. In the statements of their representatives The Alliance is not limited to protecting infrastructure alone, paying attention on a wide range of issues related to energy security and the role of cooperation among NATO members [2].

In the declaration of the NATO Summit in Wales on 5 September 2014, attended by the Heads of State and Governments of the members of the North Atlantic Council, the importance is emphasized dialogue and the role of NATO-EU cooperation, in particular on the issue of defense against cyber attacks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, eradication terrorism and energy security. Stable and guaranteed energy supply, diversification of suppliers of energy sources and raw materials and the extended system of power grid connections are nowadays critical factors. While these issues remain mainly in the hands of governments National Organizations and Other International Organizations, NATO Structures monitor developments in the field of energy security, including impacts the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa. In the declaration of the NATO Summit of Wales It was noted that we will still consult these questions and develop our ability to contribute to security energy, focusing on areas where NATO can contribute added value. In particular, we will raise our consciousness situation regarding events in the energy sector that have implications for Allied and Alliance security, building NATO's capabilities in the field protecting critical energy infrastructure and working increase the energy efficiency of our armed forces, noting in this context of the concept of ecological defense. We will also intensify our training and education efforts, continue

cooperation with partner countries fields and consult relevant organizations including the EU, as appropriate [3].

More and more space in the debate on energy security they deal with ecological problems. NATO aims to increase efficiency their armed forces and increasing the use of energy from renewable sources in the military sector. Reducing fossil fuel consumption becomes one of imperatives of modern military operations. Decisions and recommendations smart energy will not only save money reduce the use of fossil fuels, but also help protect the lives of soldiers, improve the mobility, stability and endurance of military units World consumption has changed dramatically in recent years twenty years. While energy consumption per unit of GDP in the countries developed has decreased significantly, global energy demand is steadily increasing. Over the last thirty years, North American GDP has increased by 150%, and energy consumption increased by only 25%. It's a sign of growth energy efficiency. Japanese industry is seven times more efficient in energy consumption than the Chinese industry. Efficiency energy is directly related to the level of economic development, with the economic structure, technological progress also depends on the ability to respond effectively to market signals and political decisions. Low level of investment in countries exporting energy commodities, and instability in the regions that supply most of the world's oil and gas is another serious problem.

War, terrorism, embargo, threat of parties of totalitarian regimes and political blackmail can contribute to abrupt cuts in global supplies. The Middle East produces 70% oil natural gas available on the world market and attacks against poorly defended energy infrastructure is probably the most an effective way of disrupting supplies. The political climate in the Middle East The east is tight, posing a threat to the supply to energy markets and discourages potential investors. More and more frequent armed conflicts in the fields of the extraction of raw materials have become a source of serious concern, in particular NATO countries.

Several factors affect this:

- dependence of NATO countries on imports of remote and unstable regions, which threatens to be possible interruption of supply and rapid price increase;
- the possibility of using energy resources the tools of political influence of the supplier countries;
- terrorist attacks and hacking, which, due to asymmetric combat methods make it difficult to respond effectively [4];

Considering the specificities of the different energy sectors, the most transmission lines of the oil and gas sectors are vulnerable to attack. Singularity, The oil and gas infrastructure is that it can not be only in a given country, but far beyond its borders. That's why security the energy of a particular state requires security energy infrastructure throughout the energy supply chain of space extraction or production. In this regard, the Alliance is focusing on energy infrastructure by reducing its sensitivity and probability of potential attacks NATO's role in the field of energy security in the army point of view is to ensure the operational capability of the Alliance in the sphere energy supply during the war or during operations and missions. In particular it's about preventing military threats against facilities energy, facilities and delivery routes.

A key service tool the implementation of these objectives is the NATO pipeline system, which includes ten separate systems storage and distribution of fuels and lubricants and aims to provide NATO with in petroleum products. The system crosses 13 NATO countries and

covers approximately 11,500 km of pipelines linking tanks, air bases, civilian airports refineries. At the beginning of the 21st century, the NATO Council was charged with driving consultation on immediate threats to security identify areas for possible actions aimed at the protection of the energy interests of the allies. Declaration of the Riga Summit 2006 contains commitments from allies to support international efforts to assess risks and improve the security of energy infrastructure according to with the decision taken at the Riga Summit, the report "The role of NATO in the field of energy security "and in the Summit Declaration Bucharest 2008 contained recommendations for the Alliance in the field of energy security. According to them, NATO should engage in the following areas: exchange of information and intelligence, actions for stability, strengthening international cooperation regional support and regulation of energy infrastructure protection. Alliance The North Atlantic intends to continue to coordinate its activities with international organizations operating in the field of security energy. At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, the new concept was adopted Strategic, where besides the military threats, the priority challenges [5].

The Alliance has been recognized, among others spreading missile technology and weapons mass destruction, terrorism, fight against cyberterrorism in networks data communication, safety of transportation routes and supplies energy resources, disease epidemics, climate change, lack of drink water. Particular attention was paid to the fact that energy supply, diversification of sources, suppliers and directions development of energy infrastructure at the international level an increasingly important condition for development.

The Alliance called for more cooperation in consultation and exchange of information on security energy, development of Alliance capabilities in identified areas previous summit. A decision was made to implement the security policy planning and action system of NATO, and to intensify cooperation with international organizations operating in the energy security. At the NATO summit in Chicago in 2026 confirmed again. Alliance's commitment to cooperation in the field of security energy. Creation of a special state information center NATO member states on energy issues [6].

Five of the 65 points the adopted declaration concerned entries related to new challenges security - cyberterrorist threats, proliferation of weapons mass destruction, terrorism, threats in the field of security energy, critical infrastructure protection and security ecological. All this indicates the interest of NATO for these areas likely to become important in the future policy and actions of the Alliance the security centre mentioned above started its activity Energy NATO in Vilnius.

The main initiatives taken in the context of the execution of his tasks concerns the following questions:

- information support on the identification of the main types threats to the energy sector;
- control of the supply of energy resources;
- exchange of experiences and ideas within the Alliance;
- technical assistance and training of workers from third countries
- the direct protection of energy infrastructures in the event of a potential threat, in particular tanker protection [7],

Infrastructure protection and crisis response methods with the use of force military is part of the overall initiative to ensure energy security. An example of such an approach can be the involvement of NATO's maritime component. In particular, NATO in cooperation with the European Union, carried out a multinational operation Maritime "Active Endeavor" in the

Mediterranean Sea and Operation "Ocean Shield" off the coast of Somalia. Ensuring the safety of the main transportation routes crude oil, NATO ships patrol them, providing support for the expedition their main task is to prevent the use of the sea Mediterranean for terrorist purposes. Speaking of energy, you have to point out that about 65% of the oil and gas consumed Western Europe is transported annually by the Mediterranean Sea. Protection of transport routes and prevention of major blockades Transit areas are examples of practical NATO field activities energy security, which is also an important element of the work on EU29 Forum.

At the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, they were confirmed The Alliance's strategic priorities in this area have been agreed to operation "Active Endeavor" and "Ocean Shield", and the intervention was condemned Russian army in Ukraine, demanding that Russia withdraws its forces from Ukraine the territory of Ukraine and its position along the Ukrainian borders. The In the area of energy security, the Alliance has confirmed its importance stability and security of energy supply, the need for diversification roads, suppliers and sources of energy [8].

NATO should pay even more attention for the development of events in the field of energy security, in particular related to the Ukrainian -Russian crisis and growing instability. Near East and North Africa.

The North Atlantic Alliance will be continue to look for ways to target build their capacity in the field of security the energy industry, focusing on the following areas:

- to increase NATO's critical protection capacity energy infrastructure;
- improve the efficiency of the use of fuel and energy by the army
- improvement of education and training programs in this area the domain and commitment of the partner countries to implement these programs.

On the other hand, although NATO plays an important role in energy security, for the Alliance is an undeniable fact that energy security is a national issue. Most EU countries and NATO has different approaches to the energy situation because of its location geographical basis, commodity base and infrastructure development, so that they differ in their own energy strategies. NATO's efforts are aimed at avoid confrontations between countries, by creating a consensus on a common position in certain areas, the creation of a system exchange of information and experience, building the capacities of the Member States provide infrastructure protection and create a response system crisis. Previous actions have led to specific arrangements energy security, which can be reduced to three areas [9]:

First - dialogue and the exchange of information and intelligence between allies, partners and the private sector. The main attention energy infrastructure security, in particular energy producing countries and transit countries, road safety communication and assessment of the terrorist threat. One more the aspect is the analysis of fuel supply for NATO forces participating in operations and teddy bears.

Second - actions to ensure stability. It is based on conduct political dialogue and military cooperation with countries partnerships in Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Persian Gulf. This group includes energy producers, transit countries and consumers. Therefore, energy security is in numerous bilateral and multilateral cooperation programs.

Third - the protection of energy infrastructure. Basically, it's in national authorities, but at the request of States, NATO may take part in surveillance of shipping lines and territorial waters with the help of experts civilian or military resources. In addition, NATO resources and forces can be involved in the case of technological disasters. Effectiveness of NATO's security actions energy depends to a large extent on the degree of involvement individual allies. They should be convinced that NATO proposes measures to improve the security of the various countries. Such a regular discussions during NATO internal consultations for example, when analyzing new challenges such as hacker attacks on objects the energy of the countries. An example of such an event was a computer virus Stuxnet, which infected the computer networks and paralyzed the nuclear program Iran no less effectively, like a missile attack or a bombing.

The same the computer worm in 2010 entered the software under construction The Bushehryran nuclear power station paralyzed his work for two weeks. Since then, Iran has repeatedly reported that the Stuxnet virus attacks and the flame has also been found in the oil sector, which generates about 80 percent foreign income. Powerful cyber-attackers they moved to the energy system of Ukraine in 2015, which in turn took place impact on energy supply across the country. Many attacks against refineries African and Arab countries reveal the contemporary goals of terrorism and they reveal a real level of energy security.

NATO has enormous potential that justifies its role in in the area of strategic security aspects International. In the new strategic concept alliance The North Atlantic formulates the task of developing the capacity of rapidly response in the field of energy security, including security infrastructure and transit area in cooperation with partners in the event of the occurrence of a crisis. The implementation of this ambitious joint task faces challenges arising from differences in the national interests of States. There is it is a problem not only for NATO, but for the whole of the European Union. Despite the efforts of the European Commission to develop a common policy energy, the Member States continue to conclude individual agreements energy suppliers. It means that when it comes to energy security, the countries want and will have to face the same thing. The decisive factor for energy security in Europe is dependence of the countries of the European Union on the supply of raw materials to the Federation Russian, which at the peak of innovative technologies in the world has uncompetitive economy, oriented towards the sale of raw materials, powerful deposits of coal, gas and uranium, it occupies one of the highest ranks in the world a producer of crude oil and natural gas. As an important participant in the market Russia's energy resources help undermine stability Europe by breaking up its community by conflicting interests [10].

Goals it does so by breaking the rules and norms of international law, not to mention on the basic principles of coexistence. Because the positions of the allies towards Russia's policies are not compatible, partly because of drug addiction of this country, we often observe an unpleasant lack of solidarity common energy security issues. The North Atlantic Alliance must absolutely fulfill its role ensure energy security, although this is a task deals with many entities of the European Union, International Energy Agency, OECD, to the private sector. NATO's most important skills lie in its military tasks. Of this The Alliance should fulfill its mission mainly with means military, as he did in combating dangerous hacking for oil tankers in Somali waters.

The annexation of Crimea and the aggression of Russia to the east of Ukraine may announcing a new chapter in the development of transatlantic security strategies energy. We

may be witnessing events opposed to those that took place in the seventies it's in the conditions of the cold war and the US restrictive trade policy energy commodities, the Arab embargo of 1973 for the supply of oil greatly contributed to the return of Western countries to Russia as the main supplier of energy resources. Recent events in relation to Russia's actions show that there is a big return in the European Union, the United States and other countries in the assessment of the development of energy connections with Russia. At the same time, there is an in-depth review of energy strategies at once Atlantic sides and awareness of the role of new types of raw materials energetic. NATO member states have all the possibilities successively control this crisis, strengthen the transatlantic link despite the bellicose attitude of Russia. The results of this will not only concern EU countries, the North Atlantic Alliance and Russia, but promote an open and transparent global management system and energy exchange [11].

3. EXTERNAL SECURITY OF SUPPLY

After being a net exporter of gas and oil, the United Kingdom became a net importer in 2004 and 2005 (EIA, 2011). In 2005, the British UK Presidency study concluded that stronger EU cooperation is needed to improve security. This was an important development as the United Kingdom and Germany had been key actors in opposing a 2003 Commission proposal for an article on energy. The Green Commission's March 2006 green paper called for a comprehensive common European energy policy, stressing that the energy security of the external dimension would be improved through diversified sources of supply and supply and a single negotiation [12]. The green paper also contained the objective of the regular EU Strategic Energy Reviews (SEER), the first of which was completed in January 2007, followed by the 2007 Lisbon Treaty (Council of the European Union, 2007), first time an energy title. Article 4 sets out the co-decision procedure ordinary, the "competence established between the Union and the Member States in an internal market; trans-European networks energy. Article 194 included the objectives of the Union acting "in a spirit of solidarity" to: an ensure the functioning of the energy market, ensure the security of the Union's energy supply, promote the interconnection of energy networks. However, it has also been decided that he measures should not affect the right of a Member State to determine the conditions of exploitation of its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of the energy supply its energy supply Union, 2007, Article 194). What "solidarity" means in this context remains vague. This article provided for an "interpretative rather than legally binding commitment" .In terms of formal instruments and expertise, decision making in the policy area is based on intergovernmental cooperation and remains dominated by national preferences. The Lisbon Treaty has reiterated the existing decision-making rules in the energy field.

4. EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN ENERGY STRATEGIC

The utility of energy as a means of realizing Russia's three main imperatives has changed over time because Russia has had to change its strategy in response to changing national or international circumstances. Moscow's strength lies in its flexibility in managing

its energy sector. The importance of Russian energy was established in the late 1800s, when the monarchy saw great potential for the Russian Empire if it could develop this sector on a large scale. However, the empire had neither the technology nor the capital to launch a local energy industry. As a solution, the monarchy eased its restrictions on foreign investment, urging European and US companies to develop the Baku and Volga oil fields. This provoked a brief period of warmer relations between the Russian Empire and many Western partners, particularly the United Kingdom, France and the United States. All parties quickly realized that the only way to make the Russian oil industry profitable despite the high costs associated with the country's rough and vast geography was to turn Russia into a massive producer. At the turn of the century, the Russian Empire produced 31% of world oil exports.

As the importance of the Russian Empire's energy sector increased, it became clear that Russia's internal stability was greatly affecting the sector. The Bolsheviks used the energy sector in their attempts to overthrow the monarchy in the early 1900s. The oil-producing regions were one of the main centers of action of the Bolsheviks because energy was one of the rare sectors where workers were organized. In addition, the Bolsheviks used oil rail networks to distribute propaganda across the country and abroad. In 1904, when the Russian Empire suppressed an uprising in St. Petersburg, most Bolshevik demonstrators set fire to the Baku oil fields. This reduced Russia's oil exports by two-thirds, forcing Moscow and foreign markets to realize the high vulnerability of oil exports to Russia's domestic stability.

Russia's modern energy strategies began to form after the Second World War. While the Soviet Union remained one of the two world hegemon dominating a divided Europe, Moscow saw no barrier to the dominance of the global energy sector. Between the 1950s and the 1960s, Soviet oil production doubled, making the Soviet Union the second largest oil producer in the world and the largest supplier to Eastern and Western Europe. Revenues from oil exports have started to account for nearly half of Soviet export earnings.

As the Soviet Union was producing oil en masse and the Soviet system limited labor costs, Russia could sell its oil at prices nearly 50% lower than oil in the Middle East. Subsidizing oil to the Soviet bloc and then to Western European countries helped Moscow undermine Western regimes and strengthen its position in its own periphery - a strategy the CIA called the Soviet economic offensive. For the Soviets, it was not about making money (even if they were making money), but about shaping a sphere of influence and undermining the West. This strategy came at a cost because Moscow did not bring in as much revenue as it could and was inefficiently producing oil, quickly depleting its fields.

In the 1970s, the price of oil exploded due to a series of crises, mainly in the Middle East. At the same time, Russia was already under pressure to support the massive Soviet Union. The regime of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev has had the choice: to use high world prices to raise prices in Eastern Europe and benefit the Soviet economy, or to continue to subsidize the Eastern Bloc to remain accountable in Moscow and do not push him to start thinking about other sources of energy. It was a choice between two imperatives: the Soviet national stability and the holding of the buffer zone. In the end, Moscow chose to protect its own interests and, in 1975, increased the price of oil for its customers, which allowed further increases based on world market prices. By 1976, oil prices in the Eastern bloc had almost doubled, remaining below world prices but increasing enough to force some EU countries to borrow [13-22].

The Soviet emphasis on maintaining high energy revenues continued in the mid-1980s, when these revenues accounted for almost all of the Soviet Union's hard currency inflows. But the Soviets suffered a double blow in the mid-1980s, when the price of oil collapsed and the West imposed an embargo on Soviet oil, pushing Saudi Arabia to flood the oil markets. In addition, the Soviet Union is far behind the West in technology, particularly in the fields of energy and agriculture. In response, starting in 1985, the Soviet Union moved closer to a market-based energy economy, raising prices in the Eastern bloc, demanding hard currency and allowing foreign companies to re-enter the energy sector energy. But Russian strategy changes were not profound.

5. CHALLENGES TO MAINTAIN RUSSIAN ENERGY

Russia's main concern is its vulnerability to fluctuations in the price of energy. With half of the Russian budget coming from energy revenues (80% of which comes from oil and 20% from natural gas), the government could be paralyzed if energy prices fall. The Kremlin has already reduced its budget projections for oil prices to \$ 93 a barrel instead of \$ 119 - although, even at this price, the government is playing a game of chance. Stratfor does not forecast oil prices, but historical trends show that major international crises and fluctuations in world consumption and production patterns have had sufficient effects on the price of oil and Moscow's revenues to destabilize the country.

Export revenues from natural gas are also in question. With alternative natural gas supplies online for Russia's largest consumer, Europe, the Kremlin has been forced to lower prices in recent months. This year, Gazprom plans to give European consumers \$ 4.7 billion, or about 10% of Gazprom's net sales, in the form of rebates due to price reductions.

In its current configuration, the Russian energy sector is under pressure. The consolidation of the sector mainly under two large state-owned enterprises has had many benefits for the Kremlin, but after a decade of consolidation, the disadvantages accumulate. With low competition for the Russian gas giant Gazprom, the company is lagging behind in technology and is considered hostile to foreign investment. Russia's oil giant Rosneft has recently begun to move towards a wider monopoly like Gazprom, which could lead it to fall into a similar trap. As future energy projects in Russia require more advanced technology (due to their location and environment) and more capital, Gazprom and Rosneft need modernization and foreign investment.

Corruption is also a major factor, with varying estimates of 20-40% of Gazprom's revenue lost due to corrupt or ineffective practices. Rosneft has similar problems. This loss would be sustainable with Moscow's previous high incomes, but will not be sustainable in the future if energy prices fall or the maintenance and expansion of the energy sector becomes more expensive. The Kremlin probe Gazprom, although with a culture of corruption that rages in the history of Russia, the Kremlin will not be able to do much to eliminate the wrongdoing in the natural gas business. Moreover, Europe's dependence on Russian energy is decreasing. The natural gas shortages experienced throughout Europe during the Russian-Ukrainian crises of 2006 and 2009 were a stark reminder of the vulnerability of European countries due to their dependence on Russian natural gas exports. Both unilaterally and through the European Union, European countries have begun to develop strategies to mitigate not only Europe's

vulnerability to disputes between Moscow and intermediate transit states, but also its dependence on the European Union general to Russian energy.

One of these efforts is the accelerated development of new liquefied natural gas import facilities. This will allow some countries, including Lithuania and Poland, to import natural gas from suppliers around the world and to bypass Russia's traditional lever: physical connectivity. This is particularly important given the accelerated development of many unconventional natural gas deposits around the world, particularly shale gas reserves in the United States. The development of a pipeline project that would bring natural gas from the non-Russian Caspian to the European market is another attempt - although less successful so far - to reduce European dependence on Russian natural gas.

In addition, a set of European policies, including the third energy package, has started to give EU member countries the political and legal tools to mitigate Gazprom's dominance in their respective natural gas supply chains. This common framework also allows European nations to present a more unified front by challenging certain commercial practices they consider to be monopolistic - the latest example being the Commission's inquiry into Gazprom's price strategy in Central Europe. This, coupled with EU-funded efforts to physically interconnect the natural gas networks of EU members in Central Europe [23-28].

6. CONCLUSIONS

In energy policy, the Commission has exploited its role in protecting the environment, competition and the internal market to 'create as many policy frameworks as possible to make energy legislation viable and was delegated a minor role in the dimension of external energy policy. There was an underlying trend towards increased dependence on energy imports. The price increase and the enlargement of the EU to include more Member States dependent on exacerbated imports, increased security in Russia. The Commission was then in a position that exploits the window of policy that opened up because of the two gas breaks in quick succession (2006 and 2009), legislation providing evidence of a critical moment in the evolution of energy policy.

The constant flow of the Commission in the process of establishing the program. The Commission has succeeded in creating a policy; and how politics and legislation evolve. The Commission has successfully (but not exclusively) implemented supranational governance, recommendations and regulations.

The Commission acts accordingly because it is a very effective legal act. There was a concerted effort by some, not important, NMS to resolve intra- and inter-state conflicts of interest by delegation (formally reversible) regulators and funding powers to the Commission¹³ In addition, the former Member States sec to the Kingdom As a new energy importer, he is working on the liberalization of the gas market. Pointvogl (2009) I am aware of the fact that she is a member of the world. Unlike the previous period, disruptions in the gas supply of gas, gas and gas imports from a small number of suppliers (especially Russia) go from positive to negative.

As noted by De Jong and Schunz (2012), a recent development of EU energy policy, and opposed the new delegation or erosion of sovereignty in energy security policy, especially the external dimension. As foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, Member States must defend their own energy mix, through nationality and national security. While Member States have been

reluctant to delegate to the Caspian region. The power related to implementation is a performer of the internal energy market and by checking and advising on the provision of contracts. The implementing power is also considered as a financier of the gas infrastructure (internal and external). The power to set an agenda must create a common and external dimension: the incomplete implementation of EU internal laws in the external environment. This dimension clearly demonstrates the intergovernmental logic that remains at the heart of the EU's energy security policy, mitigation of supply disruption. For example, the progress of Russia's large-scale gas pipeline projects such as Nord Stream and South Stream demonstrates the importance of Member States' preferences in the EU and the influence of their economic and security interests on the EU. The objectives of diversification of supply. Sources that both projects supported by Russia undermine.

To suggest that political decisions to a certain extent follow the direction advocated by the Commission does not exclude the influence of Member States and individual actors. The role of the Commission is also limited to limiting this research, and further work is needed to study the constellation of changing power and authority in this multi-level political sphere of governance, in which supranational institutions, national energy champions and play a role in steering the development of EU energy policy. Further research is also needed to evaluate the price; as an element of energy security, and a motivation for European integration, and the delegation of Member States' supranational powers to energy policy. As such, the impact of the liberalization of the gas market towards a single European market and the effect of supranational governance (success in creating "reasonable" prices) must be taken into account.

The Commission, as a political entrepreneur, has been an important player over time in influencing the social construction of norms concerning the desirability of a supranational solution to an issue presented as a problem, or even a threat, for the Union and would be inadequate. Thanks to the Commission's activism in the form of problem-solution coupling and 'discursive framework', the Member States have accepted a certain degree of communitarisation and supranationalism in energy policy as a means of increasing their individual and collective energy security.

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