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September 11 and the Outbreak of Neo-Orientalism in John Updike's *Terrorist*

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ABSTRACT

The portrait of Muslims in politics, media, and literature has been mostly partial images of people separated from civilization. Since September 11 attacks, the Global War on Terror was fought on many fronts, including the ideological war of words and images that rages on the cinema screens across the globe as well as the pages of pop fiction. Western cultural production since September 11 has remained deeply influenced by the events of that single fateful day. The Twin Towers have gone up in flames again and again in a very large number of textual and visual narratives like novels, short stories, films, documentaries and prose analyses. To take a critical view to 9/11 and famous narratives it encumbered is the subject of this study. The Neo-orientalists say that many Muslims are Islamic fundamentalists who are "irreconcilable" with modern Western democratic values and culture. Different novels have been written after the September 11 attacks which are related explicitly or implicitly to with the effect of the event on the changing view of the people toward Muslims.

Keywords: Neo-Orientalism, Islam, Muslim, Jihadist, Civilization, Democracy, Modernity

1. INTRODUCTION

Orientalism is a term used by scholars in art history, literary, geography, and cultural studies for the depiction of Eastern, that is "Oriental" cultures, including Middle Eastern, North African, South Asian and Southeast Asian cultures, done by writers, designers, and

artists from the West. Traditional Orientalism is not difficult to find among the first European scholars who studied Islamic philosophy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It can be summarized in the form of a few salient theories that were prevalent among such scholars.

Edward Said in his masterpiece, "*Orientalism*" (1978) believes that Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and "the Occident" (2). He also believes that the inferiority that the West attributes to the East simultaneously serves to construct the West's superiority. Identity, for Said, whether of Orient or Occident, is a construction which involves the construction of opposites and "others" whose actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from "us". The West always functions as the "center" and the East is a marginal "other" that simply through its existence confirms the West's centrality and superiority (Bertens 2001).

In the nineteenth century European views, the Orient implied "the Arab world or generally the middle East. The Orient, literally the sunrise, denoted above all the region that immediately lay to the east of Europe (Lewis 2004 b, 538). The restraint of Orientalism, in Said's view, is but an appearance of the west and Islam dualism in western scholarship. The primary assumption of Said in Orientalism (2003) is about "the Orient" that is a constituted being, and the point that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, radically different residents who can be described on the approach of some essence proper to that space is equally a highly debatable idea (322). He more intensifies the point that he never recommends a dualist approach not for it is against Islam, but for this approach in itself is a faulty ideology, stating: "the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism" (328).

Affected by some postmodernist schools of thought, Said's whole proposition sorrows from some central disputes by a number of critics like Bruce Robbins (Robbins, 1992), Bryan Turner (Turner, 1994), Richard King (King, 1999) and Michael Richardson (Richardson, 1990). Said indicates some chief problems about the validity of knowledge. He says that every representation, because it is a presentation, is embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the presenter (272). The fact that "all representation is misrepresentation of one sort or another" (Said 2001b, 237) implied to the nature of human knowledge. In Robbin's (1992) words: "If everything is a representation, then representation is not a scandal. Or if all representation is a scandal, then no particular representation is particularly scandalous" (54). Regardless, it is assumed from a practical methodology to create a more useful indication of its subject by generating better theories and also better learning from our mistakes through corrections.

In America, Orientalism, as an exhibition of cultural ascendancy by means of material possession, had already taken root at an early level. This material Orientalism was primarily connected to the Far East until nearly the mid-nineteenth century. At that point, a material Orientalism, primarily involved with the Arab lands of the Middle East, began to develop as a separate aesthetic as American Higashi in *"Cecil B. DeMille and American Culture: The Silent Era*" referred as a "retail strategy… exploited Orientalist images of exotic lands associated with luxury and sensuality, if not debauchery." (90).

Now, what is more important to argue here is not Occident and Orient which are hopelessly out Of date (Turner, 1994) and belonged to a period of history that is now behind us, but moving "beyond Orientalism" to the "post-Orientalism" era. The development of a form of global sociology" has ended the history of social-centered analyses (Robertson, 37). Yaha Sadowski indicates how after the Islamic Revolution of Iran western authorities

changed their views on interrelation between society and state in the context of Muslim world. For them, Islam was uncongenial with democracy. He concludes that: "It is long past time for serious scholars to abandon the quest for the mysterious "essence" that prevent democratization in the Middle East and tend to the-matter-of-fact itemization of the forces that promote or retard this process" (Sadowski, 1993).

2. SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE OUTBREAK OF NEO-ORIENTALIST TERRORIST

Informing against the threat of the Muslim enemy is not new in the Western world. Since the eighties some politicians, scientists, and journalists have given such informing continuously without indicating any considerable evidence to back up their worry. In this regard reference can be made to statements of the Chairman of the Club of Rome, the former Secretary General of the NATO, and of ministers and leaders of right-wing political parties in Western Europe and North America. These significant public facts are well known and indicative of the intensity of the negative aspect of the West towards Islam and Muslims. Essentially this negative aspect is undeserved and is not based on trustworthy facts. Since the end of the Cold War, Islam has been increasingly seen as the "new enemy" (or the revived old enemy) of the West. Terrorist attacks, such as the 1993 bombing at the World Trade Center, the attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and, especially, the September 11, 2001 attacks intensified these horror and brought the image of a severe Islam in opposition to American values to the national forefront. Bush championed the cause of US imperialist and capitalist designs. His administration reiterated and supported Neo-orientalist views about Islam after 9/11 attacks. To him (2004), "Islamic fundamentalists are "ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies and who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake conscience of the free world" (Speech to UNITY). Bush states Islam as intolerable, violent and backward and its followers a threat to USA. He shows his determination saying that their "grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution and either they bring their enemies to justice, or bring justice to their enemies, justice will be done" (Naqvi, 94).

Muslims, in particular Arab Muslims, have been demonized through laws, foreign policy, and popular media. As Susan Akram and Kevin Johnson point out, "[s]ince at least the 1970s, U.S. laws and policies have been founded on the assumption that Arab and Muslim noncitizens are potential terrorists and have targeted them for special treatment under the law".

The Neo-orientalists thought Islam and its movements as the main end and regarded Islam as a global danger to western civilization. As Shahid Alam (2006) puts it: What forms this repackaged Orientalism new are its ends, its exponents, and the enemy it has embattled for pulling down …. Whatever the term, it holds all Islamic movements, no matter what their positions on political uses of violence. A famous Neo Orientalist puts it: "Fundamentalism as a whole is mismatched with the values of civil society and the Western vision of civilization, political order and society" (Bernard, 4).

The words "Muslim" and "Arab," markers of religious identity, became code words synonymous with Neo-orientalist campaign principles of opposition to then candidate Obama. They drew upon a politics of fear, one that implicitly posited that Islam was un-American, despite the presence of seven million American Muslim citizens, who while perpetually insulted during the campaign, also preserved the right to vote. The last presidential campaign

approved that the concepts "Muslim" and "American" were antithetical to many in discernibly Neo-orientalist terms. This binary definition of Islamic Otherness as dangerous to this country, however, was not projected as part of American foreign policy, but instead intended a domestic political campaign for the highest office in the land. The Muslim acquisition of political power became central to Neo-orientalist American assumptions that no Muslim citizen could or ever should be president.

Dag Tuastad (2003) considers the new ways of representing the violence of Muslims and Arabs in western media as "new barbarism". The new barbarism thesis denotes descriptions of political violence that reject the political and economic interests and contexts when indicating violence as a result of traits embedded in local cultures. He argues that new barbarism has linked with Neo-orientalist legendries that represent a deep cultural dualism between Islam and The west. These waves of new barbarism and Neo-orientalism perform as hegemonic strategies when the production of enemy legendries contributes to legitimize continuous colonial economic or political projects, as can be witnessed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Today's world thinking dividing up into two opposing poles, "the West" and "Islam", "good" and "evil" or "us" and "them". As Zachary Karabell (1995) advises: "Ask American college students, in the elite universities or elsewhere, what they think of when the word "Muslim" is mentioned. The response is inevitably the same: gun-toting, bearded, fanatic terrorist's hell bent on destroying the great enemy, the United States" (39).

The other critic, Runnymede Trust states Islam as a huge static bloc, quite indifferent to change, as an isolated and the "other"; having no cultural accord with other cultures, is neither affected by nor influenced them; is seen as inferior, barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist, aggressive, violent, threatening, supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a clash of civilizations with West; is an ideology used for political or armed benefit (1997).

The events of that horrifying day were spread worldwide and reminded viewers all over the world of a scene in a Hollywood thriller. However, as Christina Rickli writes, the problem with this response was that, of course, it was not a movie. Previously, movies about America under attack had always positioned "good versus evil in a fictitious, predetermined setting where the American side wins." In most cases "the American under attack rises up and eventually defeats the perpetrator" (9). Because the actual attacks of 9/11 lacked the element of U.S. victory, they "confronted the American public with a defective and thus unsettling reference to prototypical scenes of an important Hollywood genre" (10). The movie like events were shocking, but the absence of a happy ending caused an even bigger shock.

The terrorist attacks on United States of America spurred a wave of writings based on an ideology of seeing Muslims as terrorists (Islam phobia). This wave that brought an absolute change in world scenario after 9/11 may be titled as Neo-Orientalism. Representations of September 11 as a moment of global change became the "ideological lynchpin" of the war on terror, a "rhetorical construction" that promoted the idea of America as a victim and a defender of freedom, not only in its official discourse but also in the huge cultural production ranging from Hollywood films to the pop fiction and even photography. As David Holloway writes:

> From the very beginning, '9/11' and the 'war on terror' were so appropriated by storytelling and mythmaking that the events themselves became more or less indivisible from their representations, or simulations, in political rhetoric, mass media spectacle and the panoply of other representational forms that made the events feel pervasive at the time - films, novels,

> photographs, paintings, TV drama, specialist academic debates and other
> forms of public culture and war on terror kitsch. (5)

The awful simplifications continued by the corporate media and makers and producers of the pop culture production need to be critically reflected in order to explain the contexts and complexities of 9/11 and its tragic aftermaths. The relation between terrorists, artists, fiction writers and literature has been properly described by Looney in his PhD thesis. He is of the view that almost all of those authors who have written about terrorism and art or literature, essentially address a perceived connection between the two in the realm of the aesthetics. He holds further that these critics do not see the modern terrorism merely as a political phenomenon but consider it a broader practice which incorporates aspects of media, aesthetics, and performance art.

> They argue that terrorists and artists are similar because they both
> understand how to create dramatic, symbolic events which have a profound
> effect on their audiences because both groups are adept at the use of media...
> to transport their ideas and actions. (Ibid. 40)

The process of radical instruction has been examine in several post- 9/11 novels where the writers have effort to explore the mindset of the 9/11 hijackers. However, none of the western writers have created a context large enough to include ordinary Muslims, the people who have various political and religious perspectives.

Another scholar who has criticized the literary works of after 9/11 is Richard Gray. In his ground-breaking article "Open Doors, Closed Minds: American Prose Writing at a Time of Crisis" (2009), Richard Gray started the debate by arguing how American literature has changed since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Referring that the existing 9/11 fiction fails to engage the position of the "Other" in any depth, Gray proposes that 9/11 fiction look at the events from an immigrant perspective. He argues that 9/11 literature fails to imaginatively capture the position of the "Other," criticizing its "encounter with strangeness." He encourages writers to shift their focus to "the bigger picture" instead of writing in "familiar oppositions such as 'us vs. them'" (135).

Lucy Bond, points out that the main theme in post-9/11 literature is the American citizens' experience of the 9/11 trauma. According to Bond, this fascination with the "intimate consequences for individual Americans" averts the attention away from the international consequences of the attacks, a tendency that precedes the 9/11 attacks (737-38). Her main critique is that this focus on trauma victimizes the U.S. and thus can be used as an excuse by the U.S. government to justify its aggressive military response to the attacks, by first invading Afghanistan and then Iraq (747). Totally he suggest that the 9/11 genre fails in its encounter with the cultural, and especially the Muslim, "Other" and neglects the opportunity to take an international or immigrant perspective of the events.

The notion that Islam has always been "as a culture and not only a religious creed was primitive, underdeveloped, retrograde, at best stuck in the memory hole of a medieval splendor out of which it could not disentangle itself without a radical transformation; and this could only be based on Western, rational, progressive values" (Milton-Edward. 4). But a few years later, different contests of Muslims with this important conversion called modernity and especially their defiance to be westernized, marked Islam as "something not of this modern time", but "understand as backward and anachronistic" (Ibid. 66-7).

The war on terror has changed 'Orientalism', from a European-based image of modernity that could be used to tame others into a program that establishes limit between Civilization and new Barbarism. This war started by West is a struggle for civilization. It means the others are enemies of freedom and civilization. They think themselves the holders of values, democracy, and freedom while the opposites are lacking in these traits (Crooke, Bitterlemons, 2006). In trying to understand the reasons of the events of 9/11 many popular commentators have turned to Samuel P. Huntington's provocative and controversial thesis of a 'clash of civilizations'. This account emphasized that the end of the Cold War brought new dangers. "In the new world", Huntington argued (1996),

> …the most pervasive, important and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between people belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations…And the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the fault lines between civilizations… For forty-five years the Iron Curtain was the central dividing line in Europe. That line has moved several hundred miles east. It is now the line separating peoples of Western Christianity, on the one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the other (28).

It seemed to explain the failure of political reform to take root in many Islamic states, despite the worldwide resurgence of electoral democracies around the globe. For Huntington, the defining features of Western civilization include the separation of religious and secular authority, the rule of law and social pluralism, the parliamentary institutions of representative government, and the protection of individual rights and civil liberties as the buffer between citizens and the power of the state: "Individually almost none of these factors was unique to the West. The combination of them was, however, and this is what gave the West its distinctive quality." (70-71) Although modern scientists have much in common, the presumption that modern society must approximate a single type, the Western type, that modern civilization is Western civilization and the Western civilization is modern civilization "is a totally false identification" (ibid 69). So the popular message, promoted by many Western intellectuals, that "To be successful you must be like us, our way is the only way" is merely an illusion (73).

Huntington's final proposition is that the West is in a process of gradual decline. Thirty five percent of the earth's land surface was controlled by the West in 1800, 67 percent in 1878 and 84 percent in 1914. For four hundred years inter-civilizational relations consisted of the subordination of other societies to Western civilization. The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do (51). From the early twentieth century, however, the West began to decline. Its decline has been gradual and does not proceed in a straight line. The decline could be illustrated by examining the factors of power such as territory, population, economic product, and military capability. Regarding all of these factors there has been a gradual but considerable decline since the glorious days of the West in the early twentieth century (83-91). In brief, Huntington suggests, there is an inevitable and dangerous clash between 'the West' and 'Islam'. This clash will be much worse than that of the Cold War. Although some Westerners, including President Bill Clinton and Barack Obama have argued that the West does not have problems with Islam but only

with a sector of violent Islamist extremists, "fourteen hundred years of history demonstrates otherwise. The relations between Islam and Christianity, both Orthodox and Western, have often been stormy. Each has been the other's other" (209). The central issue between the West and Islam is 'who is right and who is wrong.' Accordingly, "[s]o long as Islam remains Islam (*which it will*) and the West remains the West (which is more dubious), this fundamental conflict between two great civilizations and ways of life will continue to define their relations in the future even as it has defined them for the past fourteen centuries" (212). Finally he concludes: "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people is convinced of the superiority of their culture and is obsessed with the inferiority of their power." On the other side "The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defense. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world" (217-8).

2. 1. Islam versus Democracy!

The prevailing media and intellectual circles (a number of influential academics in the United States such as Johns Hopkins University) in the West perceive Islam at the root of the authoritarian polity in the Muslim Middle East. To them, Islam is patriarchal and lacks any concept of citizenship and freedom, since its belief in God's sovereignty has diminished popular power. Rashid al-Ghanoushi, for instance suggests that "Islamic rule is by nature democratic". The Quranic notion of *Shura* (consultation) is to ensure the compatibility of Islam with democracy, and its valuation of human beings by their piety is to imply equality in race and gender and free will. To Lewis the democratization debate in the Muslim world is a non-starter, both because of the weight of the Islamic tradition and because Islamist ideologues and leaders repeatedly speak openly against the idea of democracy (Volpi, 2009). He believes that, Islamists always showed that once they won a political rivalry they would generate an aggressive pious dictatorship worse than the previous one (Lewis 2004a. 89-96). In this way, they are going to hijack free elections as "a one-way ticket to power" (Lewis 2000. 380). He then adds that the role of religion in relation to both democracy and modernity may change significantly from religion to religion and country to country. The historical role of Christianity is different from those of Judaism and Islam. "What is clearly incompatible with both Western civilization and its distinctive brand of modernity is the subordination of the state and of science to religious control, whichever religion it may be," he concludes (Lewis 1997). Apart from theoretical arguments, Lewis believes that, practically speaking, excluding Turkey and Israel (Lewis 2003b), all other Middle Eastern countries are under authoritarian rule, and have been far from modernity and democracy for centuries. He argues that the association of law productivity and a high birth rate makes for an unstable mix, with a large and rapidly growing population. By all indicators from the United Nations, the World Bank, and other authorities, the Middle Eastern countries in social and economic matters develop more slowly than the West (Lewis 2004a. 97). Although he basically agrees that secularism is an essential prerequisite for modernity and democracy, but when he revisits his theory, he doubts whether an absolute separation between Church and State is needed. He points out that the actual obstacle in the way of modernity and democracy is the subordination of science and state to a religious authority in a way that it can dictate its terms to them.

Another critic, Esposito(1999a) is aware that the interrelation between Islam and democracy is the main source of contemporary dualism between the West and Islam. The core of the vision of an Islamic threat, he remarks, is the belief that Islam is inherently antidemocratic or at best, does not welcome democracy (240). In his view, the actual proponent of democracy in Islamic countries is Islamic modernism. Modernist intellectuals and activists have produced a growing body of literature that remarks Islamic traditions considered to be compatible with democracy (247). In his narrative on Muslim countries, he again tries to indicate how multifaceted, diverse, and complex the reality of Islam is. He often go beyond popular narratives published in headlines which more often than not label Muslims as fundamentalist and terrorist. Through studying Islamic countries, he critically illustrated many different types of political Islam. Like Ayatollah Khomeini saying on dualistic Islam in which "the world was divided into two groups: oppressors (the United States and the West in general, as well as the Soviet Union) and oppressed (Muslims and the Third World)" (113). He seriously questions the result of *tough actions* of post-9/11. He mentions, The American-led war on global terrorism has not destroyed al-Qaeda, it limited the growth of extremist groups or lessened the threat of global terrorism. In this case he accuses an "unholy alliance" of neoconservatives and the militant Christian right, in an attempt to implement a "New American century". American democratic principles and values have been sacrificed to a militant neoconservative ideology to expand America's global imperial power (Esposito 2004). The sad thing is that there are people who want to patrol "our discourse, our vision of America," who want to shut this down and at times America feels under siege, he cries (Esposito 2003c).

2. 2. Islam versus Modernity!

Modernity, as a prominent phenomenon of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, marked a change from religious matters to the rational ones of this world. A lot has been written on how the emphasis on reason, rationalism and individualism or in short the so-called humanistic values led to, paradoxically, dehumanization, to violence, racism, and genocide-- the darker side of modernity. Imperialism, as one of the manifestations of this darker side, "saw the history as a linear progress towards Western capitalism and liberal secularism, concluding with the transformation of the world into a single, global, western civilization" (Inayatullah and Boxwell 2003. 122). It situated the Western civilization as the yardstick by which non-Westerners were measured based on. "It considered what was not modern to be inferior and therefore unworthy of respect, dignity and survival" (Ibid).

Therefore, imperialism, directly influenced by modernity, oppressed and marginalized non-Western cultures, civilizations and voices and placed the modern Western culture as the norm, as the only accepted truth whose main cornerstone was secularism. Bassam Tibi in his book, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, is concerned with two aspects of modernity: the 'institutional' and 'cultural'. He argues that the institutional modernity is related to "science, technology, and the achievements (that is, the modern institutions and instruments) resulting from them while, the cultural modernity, as Habermas (1998) describes, is concerned with Western norms and values which caused such instruments" (65). Cultural modernity is based on the idea of subjectivity and individualism which portrays man free to discover his own land and nature in order to place it at the service of human beings. This view is also based on the rational worldview which emphasizes the centrality of man and his capacity to be a creator. Tibi discusses that although the West intended to transmit both of these aspects to the

occupied lands, non-Westerners or as he generally calls them, fundamentalists, dismissed the cultural modernity while embracing the institutional one (Ibid. 66). He calls this kind of modernity "Islamic dream of semi-modernity" which means the disentanglement of the instruments of modernity from the thought paradigm which led to the creation of such instruments (74). Overlooking the moderate group, the West usually denies the compatibility of Islam with modernity. Although a vast number of Muslims believe in the possibility of coexistence of modernity and Islam in a society, Westerners often ignore this fact and instead focus on the members of the second group, who are generally pointed out as Islamists, extremists or wahhabists, known for their literal interpretations of Islam and the Qur'an. Since the colonial encounters and the arrival of modernity in the Orient, wahhabists, or as the West usually calls them, fundamentalists, have usually been imaged as representing the whole of Muslim community. So, the dominant image in Western media, politics and literature has been the enmity between Islam and modernity, the deep gap between a religion which represented tradition and a phenomenon which in its very Western form dictated secularism. Emphasizing such a gap, the West assumed a "liberal/secular worldview in which only those values and beliefs that fit the grand narrative of Western liberalism were deemed acceptable", whereas others that fall outside it were assumed to imply lack of commitment to democracy, human rights and modernity (Mishra 2008. 172).

2. 3. Jihadist in the Service of Terrorism

Different verses in Quran discuss the nature and scope of 'Jihad. Jihad does not have a singular meaning and can be qualified to suggest different things. For example, jihad in the path of God, or fi sabil Allah, can mean activity that advances Allah's "kingdom on earth."[1] On the other hand, jihad of the sword, or jihad alsayf, is known as "religiously grounded warfare."[2] Literally, the word jihad does not mean "fighting" or "war" at all. A translation truer to the original Arabic would be "effort," "attempt," or "exertion," as in the exertion of all of a person's efforts to overcome evil.[3] It is not a duty that necessarily requires soldiers or even organized physical fighting. Jihad is a duty to preserve Islam; an honorable, purposeful struggle rather than an uncontrolled, violent act of destruction

Participation in the jihad, the preservation of Islam, insures the believer a place in Paradise. The great jurist Shafi'i explained that jihad is more of a communal obligation to confront the dar al-Harb's influence in daily life, a form of eternal, philosophical conflict. The nature of jihad--its scope and means--has evolved since the days of the Prophet, often reflecting political realities. During the Prophet's days, jihad was a call to put everything a person could into the service of Islam, and that included use of force in self-defense. With few exceptions, the spiritual dimension was the predominant aspect of jihad's meaning at that later time. Jihad became a state doctrine which legitimized preemptive self-defense and justified conquest. It also evolved into a doctrine supporting the use of force in the name of political legitimacy.

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[1] Robert D. Crane, "The Essence of Islamic Law", 3 J. Islamic L. 185 (1998).
[2] Bernard K. Freamon, "Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History", 27 Fordham Int'l L.J. 299, 313 (2003).
[3] See generally S. Abdel Wahab, An Introduction to Islamic Jurisprudence (1963); Ali, Mahommedan Law (1912).

Throughout the centuries, competing claimants to the khilafa resorted to it in their struggles for power. Over time, manipulation of jihad's meaning has distorted that aspect of the Shari'ah. This was possible because such manipulators of religious doctrine were allowed to do so by the official clergy and by timid or complacent governments. The record of jihad is far from clear, and the Muslim religious establishment has historically failed to clarify it. Therefore, the contemporary politicization of jihad is due in part to the absence of a coherent and authoritative doctrinal body of interpretation on the subject. Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of violence against innocent lives.

There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting civilians' life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is forbidden and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not "martyrs." Indeed peace and justice are the foundational elements of Islam. The Quran preaches pluralism, *"O men! Behold, we have created you all out of a male and a female, and have made you into nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another. Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all-aware.."* (Sura 49, verse 13*).* In addition, the Quran states, "*that if anyone slays a human being--unless it be in punishment for murder or for spreading corruption on earth--it shall be as though he had slain all mankind; whereas, if anyone saves a life, it shall be as though he had saved the lives of all mankind."* (Sura 5, verse 32). Islamic jurisprudence advocates the preservation of life, honor, and the dignity of all human life as a supreme endeavor.

The US view of Muslims and Arabs as potential terrorists has deepened the binaries by putting a major assertion on history, politics and socio-cultural variations. Muslims are labeled as terrorists due to their faith in jihad as Abdul Karim says, (Naqvi 184) "You go do Jihad some other place else", telling him how FBI raided his home and called Shehzad a terrorist. Jihad, means a struggle but its image has been injured by the West. The so-called Jihadists, too, have their hand in creating a fallacy about it. A deliberate battle against them is being waged by the Western media and politicians through the publication of profane stuff and misreading.

For some analysts, September 11 demonstrated that after the defeat of the Nazis in World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West is now confronted with another ominous threat: Islamic terrorism. Radical Islamists, or jihadists, best represented by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, regard terrorism—the organized, deliberate, and indiscriminate killing of civilians, including women and children, for a political purpose—as morally justifiable. For jihadists there are no innocents: they regard the bankers, bond traders, office workers, fire fighters, and other Americans who perished in the Twin Towers and Pentagon as backers and agents of a government that oppresses Muslims. Therefore their death was deserved. Another thing worth notable that Islam phobia has been spread widely. Certainly some people on each side want a clash of civilizations – like Osama bin Laden and George Bush – who are chiefly allies , cooperating indirectly as is commonly said.

Westerners believes, Jihadists consider terrorist attacks, which kill, destroy, and create an aura of horror in their wake, as authorized means of doing their sacred mission: regaining dignity for Muslims, carriers of Allah's message, by ending the humiliation and oppression appointed on them by Western infidels; overthrowing existing corrupt and apostate Muslim governments and replacing them with regimes committed to Islamic commandments; restoring the caliphate and Muslim religious and political hegemony over all lands where Islam once overcame and finally over the entire planet; and imposing by force if necessary, a

strict interpretation of Islamic law throughout the Muslim world. Jihadists, a number of whom have lived in Europe, hate Western civilization, which they looks as materialistic, hedonistic, and godless. Islamists, who will only accept the rule of God and his Prophet, Muhammad, are ignored and denied by secular democracies because their legitimize systems do not appoint God's rules.

For a well-known jihadist, Shmuel Bar, *The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism*, "democracy is obvious polytheism and thus just the kind of infidelity that Allah warns against." Jihadists consider democratic governments as blasphemous human contrivances that legitimize equality of women, advocate freedom of expression and religion, develop interfaith dialogue, and tolerate atheism and sexual license, including homosexuality, beliefs and practices which they regard un-Islamic and even worthy of death.

Marvin Perry Howard E. Negrin's *the Theory and Practice of Islamic Terrorism* in one of the sections of his book called "Islam not a Religion of Pacifists" refers to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as "merciless towards his enemies" that "dominated the new Islamic state" by overthrowing the Shah establish his authority;

> Khomeini showed himself ruthless during the years of his rule, as thousands of opponents were imprisoned or executed. In foreign policy, he was an unrelenting opponent of both the United States and the Soviet Union and made provocative efforts to export his revolution to other Muslim countries in the region. From 1980 to 1988, Iraq and Iran were engaged in a bitter and costly war that was prolonged by Khomeini in the hope of overthrowing the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. (31)

In the text below Perry says that, Khomeini in the years of being leader preached the virtues of martyrdom and extolled death as a continuation of life, teachings which also make up the jihadist ideology:

> Those who know nothing of Islam pretend that Islam counsels against war. Those [who say this] are witless. Islam says: Kill all the unbelievers just as they would kill you all! Does this mean that Muslims should sit back until they are devoured by [the unbelievers]? Islam says: Kill them [the non-Muslims], put them to the sword and scatter [their armies]. Does this mean sitting back until [non-Muslims] overcome us? Islam says: Kill in the service of Allah those who may want to kill you! Does this mean that we should surrender [to the enemy]? Islam says whatever good there is exists thanks to the sword and in the shadow of the sword! People cannot be made obedient except with the sword! The sword is the key to Paradise, which can be opened only for Holy Warriors! There are hundreds of other [Quranic] psalms and Hadiths [sayings of the Prophet] urging Muslims to value war and to fight. Does all that mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from waging war? I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim. (32)

The whole sections of the book indicates Islam and different Muslim's leader and governor, convince and persuade people to war and jihad against non- Islamic conquerors. Muslims should sacrifice their lives against idolatry, sexual deviation, plunder, repression and cruelty.

2. 4. Oriental Women

A brief look at the history, literature, paintings, and etc. of eighteen and nineteen centuries to the present illustrates the fact that representation of Oriental and Muslim women has not changed over centuries and some usual conventions and patterns are recurring with almost little or no change at all.

Indication of Oriental women in Western Orientalist texts is as old as Orientalism and was used as a manifestation of Muslim barbarity and backwardness. This approach have two purposes: on one hand the constructed image of suppressive and cruel Oriental males justified and was even considered as a moral imperative to conquer Eastern territories. This according to Spivak (1999) is the case of "white men saving brown women from brown men" (287) which refers to British campaign against sati, a colonialist attempt to save the so called Oriental women from Oriental men. In Orientalism there is a constant and inseparable association between the Orient and sensuality. As Said (1978) referred female Orientals are usually the creatures of a male power fantasy: "They express unlimited sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing and submissive" (207).

According to Parvin Paydar (1995) feminist Orientalism has three characteristics. First the assumption of an oppositional binary between the West and the East in which Muslim women are oppressed while their Western counterparts enjoy full freedom in their society. The second characteristic is the conception that the Oriental women are only victims of a male chauvinistic society and have no agency or resistant role in their social transformations. This approach tends to marginalize the so called Oriental women and therefore, Muslim women need saviors, i.e., the Westerns, to emancipate them from Muslim men. The third aspect of feminist Orientalism is the construction of a monolithic entity of Muslims and therefore the belief that all Muslim women are living under the same condition and have no unique aspect or identity for themselves (5-7).

The logic of the War on Terror is embedded in politics of colonialism, nationalism, and liberalism. Feminist critics Minoo Moallem and Laura Nader argue that the "Muslim Woman," especially the veiled woman, is a foundational trope for Orientalism and colonialism.[1] In the post-9/11 period notions of the assimilability of Muslim women and men are intertwined with gendered discourses of neoliberal citizenship and imperial nationalism that are expressed in rhetoric of Western modernity, democracy, and the American way of life. The preoccupation in the United States with women in hijab, or presumably "oppressed" Muslim and Arab women, coexists with a desire to rescue them from their tradition in order to bring them into the nation. At the same time, there is a deep anxiety about Muslim and Arab men as potential terrorists and religious fanatics who are antithetical to Western liberal democracy and ultimately inassimilable. Examining recent controversies about Islam, immigration, and culture in Canada and Norway, Sherene H. Razack argues that the figure of the "imperiled Muslim woman," who can be emancipated in the West and saved by Western feminists from "forced marriages, veiling practices, and female genital mutilation," provides "a rationale for engaging in the surveillance and disciplining of the Muslim man and of Muslim communities."

The tightening of borders in Fortress Europe and the U.S. garrison nation is intertwined with moral panics about defending the modern, liberal, European Western individual against the ethnic figures of the dangerous Muslim man and the oppressed Muslim woman. The politics of rescue of Muslim women is also embedded in liberal notions of individualism, autonomy, and choice that shape a binary and Neo-orientalist world view. A resurgent

imperial feminism considers that it is the United States or Western culture that must bring "freedom" to some areas of the world, even if paradoxically via a military force another case of white men attempting to save brown women from brown men. Missionary feminism has long created a cultural discourse of saving Muslim women in different colonial encounters with terrorists, disregarding the indigenous women's movements and the difficulties of race, nationalism, and class at work. For example, according to Marnia Lazreg, the French military in Algeria "found in the ideology of women's emancipation a weapon of choice" in their military strategy to counter the resistance of the National Liberation Front by professing "to liberate women (from their cultural norms deemed beyond the pale)," making women a "Trojan horse" in their "pacification doctrine". The U.S. State Department has already recruited "moderate Muslim" feminists to testify to the freedom of religion in the United States through Web chats with audiences in Muslim-majority countries. These interventions involve the use of gendered bodies and ideologies as well as assumptions about modernity, "progress," and women's rights, shaped by colonial and racial thinking.

3. CONCLUSION

The stereotypical representation of Arabs and Muslims as Jacksons puts it "tend to lump Arabs, Muslims, and Middle East into one highly negative image of violence and danger" (cited in Lester, 2011, p. 65); such images are largely drawn from collective memory than actual experience. The West and Islam are two monolithic existences, best proper with civilizations, and the modern West is the greater. Islam is seen as an unchanging and closed set of dogmas and anthropological styles, included in a common society and territory, which allows the dualist to use the term as a descriptive notion for almost everything involving Muslims. To the west view, Islam is politically radical, irrational, threatening, uncivilized, primitive and therefore dangerous, threatening our way of life, our culture, our civilization and our hard and then soft power The Orientalist and later, Neo-Orientalist notions through which Muslims have been depicted in politics and media are also significant in fiction of the recent years across the Atlantic, especially in the event of 9/11 attacks.

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