Acquisition of weapons and explosives by Islamic terrorists

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ABSTRACT

The leaders of the global jihad reveal a growing interest in the use of weapons causing the greatest damage and losses in the civilian population [1]. Al-Qaeda since the early 90s of the twentieth century was interested in buying weapons of mass destruction or components necessary to produce it [2]. Already in 1999 Osama bin Laden said that acquire nuclear and chemical weapons is a religious duty [3]. Nets of islamists also manipulate public opinion by threatening to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) [4,5]. Although these actions are purely propaganda and are part of the psychological warfare, the fact is that this grid they make progress in planning the increasingly sophisticated methods of attacks.

Keywords: Islamic terrorism, terrorist attack, logistics preparing, European Union

1. INTRODUCTION

It can be assumed that the choice of weapons to assassination influenced by several factors, namely [6]: the type of terrorist network; the place in which it operates (areas affected by war, regions with a high terrorist activity, regions inhabited by Muslims, Western countries); the effect pursued by the grid (paralysis of the economy, attacking the symbols, call the effect of fear among the population); methods of operation (single act of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, suicide attack); operational capabilities (financial resources, number of members, their skills and knowledge, know-how, contacts with experts outside the grid - especially in the field of CBRN); the availability of weapons and its components (illicit arms
trafficking, acquisition of companies, acquisition of military arsenals, areas affected by armed conflict, the local community).

2. MODUS OPERANDI OF THE ACQUISITION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES BY ISLAMIC TERRORISTS

Conventional weapons is a vital element of warfare in the areas covered by the guerrilla struggle (eg. In Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, etc.). These weapons are rarely used in single terrorist attacks in the territories inhabited by Muslims [7] (example of the use of this weapon is a terrorist attack in Amman (Jordan) in September 2006. When it shot to Western tourists, the assassination of an Israeli plane in Mombasa Kenya in November 2002 and the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008). In European countries, handguns are used minimally, eg in the case of unorganized, individual or carried out by a few independent group of acts of violence (an example can be here firing a symbol for the Jewish community synagogue in Oslo in September 2006.).

General characteristics of arms for the needs of Islamic terrorists:

- short firearms: pistols, revolvers;
- long firearms: rifles, submachine guns and portable weapons with a caliber of 15 mm, rocket-propelled grenades, portable missile defense systems, ground-to-air missiles.

Handguns can be easily purchased on the international black market (in Europe the main potential sources are the Balkans and rustic remains of the arsenals used during the wars in 1992-1995) [8]. Members of Islamic terrorist networks are people well trained in the use of this type of weapon (jihad veterans; persons who had training camps), they shall communicate their knowledge of new recruits. The use of conventional weapons by terrorist networks involved in the global jihad is low, mainly due to the fact that it does not cause significant and destructive psychological effect. The possibility of its efficient use are also limited.

Material factors or explosives, chemical compounds and mixtures capable of violent chemical reaction initiated by an external factor [9]. They can be produced for industrial and military. According to the author, the actions using improvised explosive devices (IED stands. Improvised Explosive Device) remain the preferred means of making attacks in Europe. No matter what character is a terrorist network and at what geographical area operates, the fact is that the IED has long been a key weapon used by terrorists because they provide the ability to customize to suit your needs the following parameters:

- the type of explosive used (fixed and plastic - because of the ease of use);
- the type of material to fill the unit (metal);
- initiating device (electrical detonation remotely controlled by mobile phones, pagers, fax machines, batteries, special systems, explosion by pressure);
- masking or hiding the device (improvisation).

Islamic terrorist networks use the explosives industry because of their availability and affordable price [10,11]. The terrorists are trying to acquire explosive devices and materials of dual use (eg fertilizer) directly from manufacturers or through intermediaries. In areas affected by conflict (Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya) the terrorists often use military explosives.
that can be earned in the arsenals of the local branches of the military (through theft) or obtained as spoils of war (after winning the skirmish). Explosives are the most common and most effective elements of the IED used by terrorists, especially when suicide bombers.

Conventional weapons remains the most widely used means of struggle, even if technically well-equipped terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda [12]. During the planning of terrorist acts (attacks against persons or objects, suicide bombings) extremists prefer methods of operation using bombings using improvised cargo. The effects of such an assault will be disproportionately high if the bomb will be placed at the scene of the attack by a suicide bomber. Making suicide bombings allow Islamic terrorists to experiment with less secure forms of IEDs, which do not require complicated supply initiation devices are unprepared.

The choice of targets of attacks is the most important issue for the development of the terrorist network [13]. Terrorists choose poorly protected objects (which do not have sufficient protection) in which the lives of many people and whose attack will cause the death of many victims, but also will have a devastating psychological effect in the form of pressure on society (bomings in 2004 in Madrid and 2005 London took place in the means public transport) [14]. Ways and means of obtaining conventional weapons vary depending on the operational capabilities and the region in which it operates a terrorist network. Terrorists planning to attack use the contacts maintained with well-equipped group to me criminal, or use their own resources to avoid unmasking. Adequate and readily available source of obtaining weapons are in conflict areas or hot spots of global jihad, which is in circulation many unregistered weapons. An important source of obtaining weapons by terrorist networks operating in Europe (controlled by Al-Qaeda ideologically inspired by it or autonomous cells) may be the Balkan region, where you can get a lot of pieces of unregistered weapons.

In the course of the investigation of the terrorist attacks carried out in March 2004 (Madrid) and July 2005 (London), it was found that the net operating on the Old Continent prefer to use their own sources of weapons. It is rather the result of effective control and monitoring of radical Islamic circles. When planning attacks extremists in Europe are focused on acquiring weapons from local sources by stealing or purchasing from members of criminal circles. Weapons or components for improvised explosive devices are most often bought in parts from several vendors. Islamic terrorist networks have the necessary knowledge and skills in the field of pyrotechnics (in their ranks a sufficient number of trained bomb squad, veterans of the jihad, advisers from outside the grid derived from the environment of former soldiers) that facilitate the construction of explosive devices homemade. In addition, these nets spread between its members - especially via the Internet - manuals and instructions on making bombs.

3. LOGISTICS POSSIBILITIES OF OBTAINING NON-CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CBRN) BY ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS, AND USE IT FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS

By unconventional weapons (CBRN) weapons meant a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons is a grade of weapons of mass destruction, the main factor is the gross chemical toxic properties. Often the term is synonymous with gas warfare, as most - though not all - types of chemical weapons is based
on compounds, which at room temperature are gases, or liquids with high vapor pressure (they are then used as an aerosol) [15]. The term chemical weapon, however, has a broader meaning, apart from the gross factor also includes equipment and technology for the handling and administration.

In the past, extremists have tried to use chemical weapons in the attacks. An example of this is the Tokyo subway sarin attack in March 1995. Organized by the sect Supreme Truth (Aum Shinrikyo) [16]. As a result of the attack killed 12 people and nearly 6 thousand was injured. Another example of the use of chemical weapons attacks are carried out by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (March 16, 2007). As a result 8 people were killed and 350 were injured or suffered poisoning. Using the islamists explosive combined with chlorine indicates the use of their new, real possibilities of combining materials CBRN attacks and conventional bombs. Muslim terrorists now improve the technical aspects of the use of hazardous chemicals for the needs of attacks. The use of chemical weapons but can cause losses among members of the organization and scare off potential future sponsors, to the above Islamists will carefully consider the use of such weapons, although it can not be ruled out [17].

The main components of biological weapons are pathogenic micro-organisms (pathogens: viruses, bacteria, fungi and molds) and their toxic secretions (toxins). Biological weapons manufactured to military purposes is based on the microbes of anthrax, staphylococcus enterotoksynie, Ricin, venom, botulism and smallpox viruses. This type of weapon attacks the respiratory tract and the skin surface. It may cause death from sepsis, or penetration of bacteria into the bloodstream, or toxemia (blood poisoning). Biological weapons have the following characteristics: small production costs; high efficiency; poor detectability in the initial stage; a short incubation period.

Islamic terrorists are focused on acquiring materials necessary for the production of biological weapons since the early 90s of the last century. Production takes place in the so-called kitchen labs. The difficulty of using this type of weapon remains Islamists effective spread of biological substances. Guidelines that terrorist networks may be so determined to continue attacks using biological agents, are specific instances of use of these substances: Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh sect has used sticks of salmonella in 1984; supreme truth sect served in 1993-1995, botulism, anthrax and sarin. [18]

Some biological materials are widely available due to the openness of the market (dual-use materials are used in the production of insecticides, fertilizers in agriculture or in the production of dyes), and others can get in scientific centers or create with uncomplicated household. These substances can also be obtained illegally by stealing from research labs or military warehouses. However, there are some biological factors, such as. Viruses (category III), which is difficult to handle, so deal with them should be experts with the right equipment and knowledge. One of the most accessible biological substances that can be used to carry out the attack is ricin [19].

Obtaining the necessary materials and the production of poison does not require great skill or resources. The plant called castor oil, whose seeds are used to produce ricin, a commonly occurring and can be processed in makeshift labs. A European investigation and search the premises belonging to the Muslim extremists revealed the production process they ricin (eg Mesh ricin arrested in London in 2003, associated with Abu Doha). The most advanced project production of biological weapons by terrorists was the project of Al-Qaeda linked anthrax. Hambali, linked to Al-Qaeda organizer of the attacks in Bali (October 2002). Dealt with developing a program to use anthrax.
It is important to distinguish between technologically advanced nuclear weapons produced within the nuclear programs, since radiological weapons (a dirty bomb). The first is to liberate the enormous amount of energy during a nuclear explosion. It is assumed that both the technology and enough fissile material suitable for the production of these weapons are virtually inaccessible for entities other than the state, except through sponsorship from a foreign country. In turn a dirty bomb is typically understood as a device designed to scattering of radioactive material in a limited area by means of conventional explosives. The aim of the use of a dirty bomb is not causing large numbers of casualties. At high doses of radioactive factors, however, can suffer a lot of people, cause panic in society.

Nets Islamic terrorists are considering the use of nuclear weapons carried out terrorist attacks. Repeatedly they tried to gain access to such weapons or their components, and acquire the necessary knowledge to produce it or get expert help in this regard.

The use of nuclear weapons depends on:

- the availability of necessary materials,
- the skills and knowledge needed to use these materials.

Due to the fact that Muslim terrorists did not use even nuclear weapons, it can be assumed that their skills in this area are still small. Weapons or nuclear technology are virtually unattainable for non-state actors, and it is unlikely that nuclear power will cooperate in this regard with the terrorists, but not be ruled out. It should be mentioned the so-called member threshold (rogue state). This term was introduced and used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in relation to the state, which could relatively quickly to build nuclear weapons and is not a party to the NPT. By the end of 2003. This system ratified by 189 countries. The only countries that did not sign, are Israel, India and Pakistan, North Korea in April 2003. Unilaterally withdrew from it. United States of trying to replace the term state of concern (state special concern).

Countries that have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but does not fully apply to its observance are Iran and Syria. IAEA report of 19 November 2008 r., Suggested that Syria was trying to develop a secret nuclear program. The authors say that the debris object in the center atomic al-Kibar, bombed by Israeli planes in September 2007. Can prove the existence of an underground nuclear reactor. The shards of debris detected because traces of graphite and uranium. UN inspectors investigated earlier allegations against Syria, which is based on the information the US would work with the North Korea nuclear reactor under construction in the center of al-Kibar.

More accessible to terrorists seems to be a radiological weapon because many substances of this type can easily be obtained from poorly protected objects (eg. Hospitals, research laboratories, waste disposal points, factories, etc.). Production dirty bomb does not need to dispose of this technology, as in the case of nuclear weapons. Previous actions of Islamic terrorists do not indicate, however, that they have this kind of weapon. However, you can not rule out an attack with its use, due to the growing interest in Islamic radiological materials [20].

In the era of globalization and technological development established with, among others, the dynamic development of ICT networks in the sphere of legal control on the export of goods and technologies of strategic importance for national security and the maintenance of international peace in the world appears elusive concept of technology transfer. It is defined as a transfer by way of verbal (during conferences, symposiums, fairs, discussions and other
meetings), as well as electronic mail (e-mail), all information relating to goods and dual-use technologies, including software aimed at producing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Due to the fact that Islamic terrorist networks use the Internet, it is expected that this was the way can exchange information on production, use and operational use of nuclear weapons [21].

Acquisition by islamists nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union constitutes a real threat of its use. In the countries of the former Soviet Union is still approx. 950 seats, where the stored enriched uranium and plutonium. The main security of many magazines is a metal mesh, protect them and badly paid and corrupt guards. So far, they reported the disappearance of the former Soviet bases, at least 40 atomic bomb suitcase.

Journalists Israeli newspaper The Jerusalem Report claimed that members of Al-Qaeda for 30 million dollars and two tons of Afghan heroin bought several nuclear suitcases [22]. At the end of the 70s in the Soviet Union, the nuclear industry employed about one million people. After the collapse of the Soviet empire, this industry declined. Taking advantage of this situation, the terrorists attempted to purchase nuclear weapons. Efforts bin Laden were so intense that at the end of 1998 - after the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania - the Federal Court in New York, accused him of preparing a nuclear attack. Magazine Jane's Intelligence Review reported that attempts acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorists intensified in the summer of 1994. When Chechen guerrillas captured base nuclear Bamut. In western countries they did not know about the existence of this secret base. Representatives of the German government announced that in the years 1994 -1996 Iran bought a Transcaucasia several finished goods, among other things, a suitcase atomic probably stolen by Chechens with Bamutu. Data from German intelligence also shows that the Chechens, who stole the weapon, maintain contacts with Al-Qaeda. Federal Supervision of Nuclear Safety of Russia, admitted that the theft of fissile material occur there quite often. In 1990 counterintelligence Germany revealed four cases of smuggling of radioactive materials from the former Soviet Union. A year later revealed 41 similar attempts.

In the 1994 Russia recorded 182 attempts of illegal export of uranium and plutonium. Russian authorities say the in 1991 there has been 23 attempts to steal fissile material of nuclear facilities and the Soviet landfills scattered in more than 40 locations in Russia and the former union republics. The international community is concerned about the close cooperation of Russia with Iran. In 1995. Iran bought nuclear reactors, while organizing the Community of Independent States (CIS) share of sourcing specialists in the production of nuclear weapons. Without difficulty he has brought many scientists. He offered them an annual salary of 100-300 thousand USD.

4. CONCLUSIONS

When planning terrorist attacks rely heavily on conventional weapons, especially the various types of IEDs [23]. However, the scale of damage that could result from an attack using a CBRN weapon (chaos trumpeted by the media) constantly attracts them. In a statement issued in September 2006. The then leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, said that the mujahideen in Iraq in need of chemists, physicists and nuclear experts and invite them to join the jihad [24].
Control of exports of goods of strategic importance makes it difficult to Islamists acquiring the materials necessary for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Control refers to activities related to foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance for national security and for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is not limited only to the activities related to the licensing of export, import, brokering, technical assistance and transit of strategic goods, but also includes measures to support enterprises, eg. By providing reliable economic operators who have implemented mechanisms of self-control, greater independence, which contributes to improve competitiveness in international markets.

From the point of view of the use of CBRN weapons by Islamists, of paramount importance is access to it and to the means of delivery. Council of the EU, trying to restrict access to the technology necessary to produce such weapons, in December 2008. Adopted a Common Position setting out the rules governing control of exports of military technology and military equipment, which includes the criteria of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, having previously recognized political declarations.

In the protection of Polish operations against Islamic terrorist networks associated with the purchase of military technology (eg. By the state supporting terrorism), you will need to change national legislation. This must result in the amendment of the Act of 29 November 2000 r. On foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance, as well as for the maintenance of international peace and security. Control of exports of military technology should be based on these criteria:

- respect international commitments by recipient country,
- sanctions adopted by the UN or the EU,
- compliance with international humanitarian law,
- conditions in the context of internal armed conflicts,
- stability in the region,
- take into account the policy of the state which is the final recipient against terrorism,
- the risk of diversion of military technology and equipment in the country,
- possibility of re-export.

The national export control system operates on the basis of the regulations contained in:

- Act, of December 2 1993, on the principles of special control of foreign trade in goods and technologies in connection with international agreements and obligations as modified by the article 57 of the Act, of August 8 1996, amending certain laws government of functioning of the economy and public administration,
- Implementing regulations issued by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Minister of Economy,
- Ordinances Minister and Minister of Economy on the Schedules of Goods and Technology and Letters Armament under special control of foreign trade under the above.

The existence of an effective system of control of foreign trade in strategic goods, including advanced goods and dual-use technologies, is essential to prevent terrorists from Islamic access to CBRN weapons and their means of delivery, and other advanced
technologies and goods of military significance in connection with the trends their use by high-risk countries, that can support the Islamists. Polish security largely depends on the effective functioning of the national export control system, and consequently cooperation with international control regimes. This cooperation has a great impact on reducing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and preventing the acquisition and stockpiling by terrorists.

Control Regimes:

1. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
2. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
3. The Hague Code of Conduct against missile proliferation (HCOC).

Limiting the possibility of uncontrolled transfer of such materials on Polish territory as a result of an effective system of export controls can have a significant impact on increasing the internal security by hindering the access to these materials extremists. The law on foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance, as well as for the maintenance of international peace and security indicates the state institutions cooperating with each other within the framework of Polish export control system. One of them, which is responsible among other things, to monitor threats related to international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the Internal Security Agency. Act on it defines the tasks, which include: identification, prevention and detection of crime in the field of production and illicit goods, technologies and services of strategic importance for national security. The role of the National Security Agency (NSA) is not limited to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes, but lega also active participation in creating internally coherent and effective system of trade control and anti-proliferation, and the acquisition by the Islamic terrorists of weapons of mass destruction. In light of the Act, NSA is one of advisory, made by Polish companies or carried out on the customs territory of the EU, commercial transactions relating to goods of strategic importance.

At the moment, given the current political situation in threshold countries increases the risk of access to weapons of mass destruction by Islamic terrorist networks and the possibility to use it in attacks. Such a threat may arise when dealing with problems in regional conflicts. On the other hand, the factor reducing the risk of this risk may still be low level of technological advancement in the field of Islamic terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, which currently does not allow for the creation of a real threat, among others, missile attacks due to the limited nature of play. We must also remember that the level of risk of a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction is hardly verifiable, and protection of such operations difficult.

From the point of view of the Republic of Polish, the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is vital to its security. However, due to limited financial resources, it is not in the interest of Polish disproportionate to the risk of support and commitment to the project of NATO or the EU in this regard. This could reduce the possibility of implementing other much more reasonable expenses. Poland, as a signatory to a number of non-proliferation agreements, should offer to increase the share of our services and institutions responsible for detecting risks associated with the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means FOR IN worn as part of tackling the problem of Islamic terrorism and support logistics activities carried out by extremists.

Biography

Wojciech J. Janik – Ph.D., university lecturer, a professional soldier, author of several monographs and dozens of scientific articles in the field of modern terrorism, national security and war theory with particular reference to the hybrid war.

References


[21] Adamski, Jacek, op. cit., p. 84.


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