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The safety aspect in the Kurdish autonomous region

Anna Nurzyńska

The Institute of Social Sciences and Security,
Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities,
2 Konarskiego Str., 08-110 Siedlce, Poland

E-mail address: nurzynska.ania@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The geopolitical situation and the common thought and action allow the Kurds to think realistically about creating a Kurdish state in the future. Can play a very important world powers: US, Russia, China and pretending to titters of Turkey. Each of these countries greedily looking at the natural resources on the territories of Kurdistan, which are necessary for their development. Political autonomy of the Kurdistan Region has a good chance to strengthen, as far as the constitution of its foreign relations (diplomatic and economic) and a deepening of political unification and the Administration, if in the future there will be serious disagreements between the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which may be used by Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara to weaken the Kurdish government. The essential question in the case.

Keywords: security; autonomy; the Kurds

INTRODUCTION

The situation of the Kurdish people seeking to use their own hard sovereign and independent state is very complex and complicated. This is due inter alia the belief that the settlement of the Kurdish issue in a Middle East country would entail a chain of claims and claims in other countries of the region [1].

WHO ARE THE KURDS? - PRELIMINARY INFORMATION

Kurdistan (autonomous region) - an autonomous administrative unit, which is the

subject of a federal Iraq. Kurdistan is located in the north-east of the country and includes the 3 provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk and Irbil, and partly provinces of Diyala, Nineveh and At-Tamim. The capital of Irbil autonomy is called Kurdish Hewlêr.

Kurds the world's largest nation without a state [2]. There are more than 30 million.

A land called Kurdistan is divided between four countries: Turkey - (20 million Kurds), Iraq - (5 million Kurds), Iran - (4 million Kurds), and Syria - (1 million Kurds). Kurds have always been only a meaningless pawn in the politics of the great powers (Russia, England, USA). The only region where the Kurds manage to get autonomy is the northern part of Iraq [3]. It was called the Iraqi Kurdistan.

HISTORICAL CONDITIONS

Kurdish autonomous region was originally created in the 1970s as a result of the agreement Iraq- Kurdish. Working Party of Kurdistan since 1984, Saddam Hussein actually ruled the territories of northern Iraq, has long been struggling to obtain autonomy in the region of south-eastern Turkey. Autonomy, which the Turkish government does not want to hear [4].

Therefore, the Kurds took armed struggle to have what belongs to every nation - his own piece of land. In practice, this autonomy was fictional, until 1991, when it lost as a result of the Iraq war, was established in the north and south of the country off zone for Iraqi aircraft [5].

Until October 1991 the Kurdish forces drove Iraqi troops from Kurdistan, establishing a de facto independent Kurdish state (but never declared the independence of Kurdistan). Power in the region split into two competing parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party Mustaf Barzani (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Jalal Talabani (PUK) [6].

After the war, 2003 and the establishment of the new Iraqi authorities signed a new agreement with the Kurdish authorities. The new Iraqi constitution of 2005 sanctioned the existence of the Kurdistan Regional Government [7] having full internal autonomy in the area of Kurdistan.

Kurdish autonomy (the name of the Iraqi Kurdistan after passing through the filters of political correctness) was founded 1991. - After the First Gulf War. The uprising was brutally crushed by the Republican Guard of Saddam Hussein [8]. It killed about 60 thousand people, and more than 1.5 million Kurds fled to neighbouring countries. Then France, United Kingdom and the US took military intervention to allow the return of displaced Kurds to Iraq. It was an expression of gratitude to the United States for helping the Kurds in the uprising against Saddam [9]. In the north under the protection established by the UN no-fly zone was established over 36 parallel safety zone the protecting the Kurdish population from attacks by Iraqi aviation. Kurds alone "autonomy" but not enough - they want to have a normal state and full independence. However, without the support of Turkey and Iran will not be able to get it [10]. And both of these countries not really depend on a strong and independent Kurdistan. For many reasons. The main course, is oil.

Iraqi Kurds, it became obvious that the Iraqi Arabs is not possible to create a democratic state. They began more and more to talk about sovereignty. But the Kurds do not have any strong protector who would support their aspirations for independence. Neighbouring countries like Iran, Turkey, and Syria, are not interested in establishment of Kurdish state in Iraq, because their territories are a lot of the Kurdish minority, which also think about

independence [11]. USA - the largest power - opts for the indissolubility of Iraq, although many American congressmen has a different opinion on the matter from the President. Americans for now, in exchange for access to the Turkish military airport in Incirlik, Turkish support the bombing, officially IS unofficially on Syrian, Turkish and Iraqi Kurds [12].

ANALYSIS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION OF THE KURDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In Iraqi Kurdistan people lives in affluence. Under the agreement with Baghdad representing approx. 20% of the population Kurds have the right to 17% of the profits from Iraqi oil [13]. Baghdad considers, however, that it should export only state-owned companies (dependent on the central government in the capital). Meanwhile, the Kurds themselves started to conclude contracts with foreign oil giants like ExxonMobil, Chevron and Gazprom [14]. In Kurdistan it is in fact much less bureaucracy than in Iraq and corruption virtually non-existent. There is also a lot easier for foreign investors [15]:

- free transfer of land for strategic investments and for smaller projects with a minimum fee
- exemption from taxes for a period of at least five years
- ability to transfer abroad all profits and interest earned by a foreign investor under the provisions of this Decision
- do not use any differences or preferences between Iraqi investors and foreign matters relating to investment law.

Since 2003, stronger economy in Iraqi Kurdistan attracted around 20,000 workers from other parts of Iraq. Currently, the region has the lowest poverty rate in Iraq. The infrastructure is still under construction. Its shortcomings are the result of previous wars in Iraq. However, you can get to any neighboring country [16]. The resulting also two airports in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah proposing flights to the Middle East and Europe. It is supported by companies such as Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa, Etihad, Royal Jordanian, Gulf Air, Middle East Airlines, Atlas Jet and Fly Dubai. For use are also at least two military airports [17].

Most investments leading Turkish companies here. Both parties outside the economic objective also see political gain. Ankara wants to weaken the support of the authorities in Erbil for Turkish Kurds, the Iraqi Kurds see the Turks the chance to become independent of Baghdad.

KURDS GOES OFF FINALLY INDEPENDENCE?

Iraqi Kurdistan - although administratively is part of Iraku- is safe. This is the only area in the whole of Iraq, where there are no American soldier was killed. And only where the Americans (during the occupation of Iraq after the second Gulf War) felt secure enough that it took off bulletproof vests[18]. Since 2007, there was no coup, while in other cities of Iraq (Baghdad, Fallujah) killed an average of 1,000 people each month.

Security Kurdistan owes the soldiers called Peszmerga (Kurd. Those who look death in the eye) - the traditional name for Kurdish militants fighting in guerrilla uprisings and for the independence of Kurdistan. Border control is so perfect that no terrorist can not enter Iraq undetected. Unfortunately, in some way in the September 2013 defense system failed.

In the capital of Kurdistan - Erbil destroyed two cars filled with explosives. It killed 14 people. On the one hand, Iraqi Kurdistan is very safe, and the other nearly everyone carries a gun. Kurds certainly accustomed to seeing weapons (they had no choice in total). Tourists take more time. On the one hand, the Kurds are people extremely helpful, accommodating and friendly. On the other they must live in constant tension, ambient by foreign armies, guerrillas and no one's own minefields [20].

In Kurdistan, you can feel safe. But the amount of weapons, checkpoints, policemen and soldiers guarding the roads to the towns and villages lets not forget that at any moment can happen something bad.

Recent events in the Middle East (creation of the caliphate in Syria and Iraq), paradoxically, may be beneficial for the Kurds. Both the USA, Turkey and Iran is slowly beginning to depend on a strong and independent Kurdish state. They see in him because the only hope to stop the terrorists ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). For now, all indications, however, that forever ended the time of moderate stability in this region of the world [21].

Today Kurdish Autonomous Region with about 5 million people is actually very independent and prosperous country compared to Dubai. Shared resources of oil recoverable - 45 billion barrels. It is also the largest in the area of Iraq's gas reserves. The border with Turkey hour exceed a powerful tank. Oil and gas pipelines pumping - raw materials are the financial foundation of the Kurdish economic miracle[23]. And not only economic, politicians and political scientists agree that the Kurdish Autonomous Region is a true safe haven of civilization and prosperity, and even democracy among the Middle hell. In the political arena they count two parties, rather conservative - the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The leader is the first Masoud Barzani, president of Kurdistan Autonomous Region, on the other - Jalal Talabani, since 2005. Until 2014. Iraqi president (his successor is also a Kurd and also the PUK).

Across the border, in Turkey, Kurds were organized primarily under the flags of the Labour Party of Kurdistan (PKK). As they assessed the analysts - Maoist. Before 1992. There was reasoned opinion, that it supports and finances the USSR. PKK appeared on a list of terrorist organizations [24].

Iraqi Kurds pursue an active foreign policy. They have their representatives in Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Russia, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA and the EU. Their main objective is to promote their autonomy and encouraging investors to invest in the region. A little more, because the 27 states has its headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan [25].

CONCLUSIONS

1. The efforts of the Iraqi Kurds to increase the autonomy and, ultimately, secession, will soon gain momentum. Iraqi Kurds for many years, ably led domestic and foreign policy, developing their autonomy and weaving between Ankara,
2. Washington, Baghdad and Tehran. The current situation in the region (the conflict in Syria, the weakness of the government in Baghdad offensive Islamist, pro-Kurdish attitude of the government in Ankara) gives them the possibility of creating an independent Kurdistan.
3. Change in Turkish policy towards the Kurds testifies to the reorientation of Turkish

- foreign policy. Ankara, in the face of the war in Syria, a possible civil war in Iraq and the growing influence of Iran, looking for stable allies in the region. Rich in oil, democratic and having a strong army of Kurdish autonomy appears, despite the historical animosity between Turks and Kurds, as the main ally of Turkey.
4. Iran does not officially take the voice of the Kurdish independence, but maintains very good relations with the Kurdish government in Erbil. In the case of an independent Kurdistan Tehran is likely to provide support Irbilow (treating Kurdistan as a buffer state).
 5. Israel supports the idea of an independent Kurdistan, which would become the country a key Muslim ally in the region, in addition providing oil supplies. It is likely to continuing its support of the Kurdish politicians by Tel Aviv.
 6. The United States supports the unitary Iraq and do not take the voice on the possible granting support Kurdish aspirations for independence, for which seeks Israel. Washington calls Irbil to support Baghdad.
 7. Poland is one of 31 countries that have in Erbil their diplomatic representations. Further political change in Kurdistan can become an opportunity to intensify contacts with autonomy, including economic.

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